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Abstract
This paper exploits the unique institutional features of South Africa
to estimate the impact of provincial public spending on rm produc-
tivity. In contrast to existing microeconomic evidence, we explore the
e¤ects of scal expenditures and remove the e¤ects of revenue rais-
ing policies. Our identication strategy is based on di¤erences in the
e¤ects of public spending across rms within the same industry and
province. We show that public spending composition a¤ects produc-
tivity depending on the capital intensity of rms, with less capital
intensive rms being particularly a¤ected. These e¤ects appear to be
robust.
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1 Introduction
It has long been understood within theories of economic growth and devel-
opment that changes to scal policy, including changes in the composition
of public spending, a¤ect aggregate outcomes such as the rate of economic
growth (Barro, 1990; Devarajan et al. 1996). Increasingly, cross-country em-
pirical evidence has been found to support these model predictions. Adam
and Bevan (2005), López and Miller (2007), and Hong and Ahmed (2009) all
nd for example, that greater productive expenditures, usually dened as in-
cluding spending on transport, communication, education, and health, have
signicant positive growth e¤ects (Gemmell et al., 2012, provide a recent
survey).
The consistency of these ndings suggests that they are robust. But be-
cause they are generated using macro data, they are still subject to criticism
of Schwellnus and Arnold (2008) that they hide variation in their e¤ects
across rms and leave unclear the mechanism through which they are e¤ec-
tive. Complementary evidence at the micro level is relatively uncommon and
focused on a relatively narrow set of questions however; an outcome of lim-
ited availability of scal expenditure data measured at a sub-national level.
As a consequence the literature has concentrated on the e¤ects of changes to
transport infrastructure, see for example Datta (2012), Shirley and Winston
(2004) and Reinikka and Svensson (2002), and Arnold et al. (2008), or the
investment climate more generally, see for example Bastos and Nasir (2004)
and Dollar et al. (2005).1
In this paper we contribute to our understanding of the e¤ects of scal
policy by studying the e¤ect of changes to the mix of public spending on the
productivity of South African rms. For this task we exploit the richness
of the scal data for South Africa, which include detailed types of health,
education and transport expenditures at the province level. In this regard
we build most closely on the work of Bekes and Murakozy (2005) and Gabe
(2003), who nd somewhat mixed evidence for the e¤ects of scal policy on
rms. Bekes and Murakozy (2005) nd that in Hungary public investment by
the central government had positive and signicant e¤ects on rm productiv-
1Our paper is also related to a large literature that dates however at least back to
Mera (1973) which examines the e¤ects of the stock of public capital (broadly dened) on
private sector output at a more aggregate level; see Romp and de Haan (2007), Straub
(2008) and Ligthart and Suárez (2011) for surveys of the literature. Several papers of this
literature also exploit variation at the subnational level including Mera (1973), Garcia-
Milà and McGuire (1992), Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995) and Evans and Karras (1994). In
addition, as Ligthart and Suárez (2011) note, many studies estimate a production function
with public capital as in input. In this paper, we consider the ow of public spending as
an explanatory variable and use rm-level data.
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ity, but that the e¤ect of public investment by municipalities was negative.
Gabe (2003) uses expenditure and revenue data to explain the growth of U.S.
rms (measured as the change of employment), but nds no signicant e¤ect
from either.
Alongside our interest in the e¤ects of the mix of government spending
we di¤er from the existing literature in our ability to disentangle this from
revenue raising policies. At the provincial level in South Africa discretionary
scal policy exists for the mix of expenditures. All broad based taxes are
identical across provinces, and borrowing at the sub-national level is limited.2
As a result, the level of public spending can be viewed as exogenous to the
individual province as it is dependent on grants from the central government.
This is important in light of ndings from macro growth regressions which
show that the implicit assumptions about how scal changes are nanced
have a strong e¤ect on the relationship with growth (Kneller et al., 1999).
To preview our results, we nd that reallocating public resources can af-
fect the productivity of some rms in the short to medium run (our data
do not allow us to describe longer term impacts), where we use the capital-
labor ratio to di¤erentiate di¤erent types of rms. In this regard our ndings
support the argument of Schwellnus and Arnold (2008) that the e¤ects of s-
cal policy di¤er across rms, and, in addition, demonstrate that one of the
transmission mechanisms through which aggregate growth changes occur is
by changes to the productivity of rms. In our most parsimonious specica-
tions we nd that increasing expenditures on education, health, and trans-
port as a share of total expenditures has a robust, positive and signicant
e¤ect on the productivity of rms with the lowest capital-labor ratios (the
bottom quartile).3 For those rms that use capital-to-labor with a greater
intensity the e¤ects are less frequently signicant, while for those rms with
the highest capital-labor ratios we nd no e¤ect.
We test the robustness of our ndings to the inclusion of a wide set
of province-industry and time dummies that might plausibly capture the
e¤ects of any omitted variables. For example, the productivity of rms and
the choice of province-level scal expenditures might be a¤ected by time-
invariant province-industry specic factors such as geography or climate. Or
public expenditures might be targeted at particular industries in particular
provinces because they have lower or higher productivity than elsewhere. Or
it could occur that unobserved province-specic shocks a¤ect the productivity
of rms within a province and, through the automatic stabilizer mechanism,
2We describe the details of the system of scal decentralization in the Appendix.
3To correct for province-specic industry factors that cause the average capital-labor
ratio to vary systematically across provinces and industries, the capital-labor ratio of the
rm is measured relative to the mean in each individual industry and province.
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may generate a change to the mix of expenditures. We continue to nd
throughout this part of the paper evidence that rms with di¤erent capital-
labor ratios are a¤ected di¤erently by changes to the expenditure mix. We
cautiously describe this evidence as indicating rising (short-run) productivity
of those rms with relatively low capital-labor ratios, and as consistent at
least with a causal interpretation. The disadvantage of such an approach is
that we cannot identify the overall magnitude of the e¤ect of scal policy
as any direct e¤ects are captured by the province and industry dummies we
include.
We also explore whether other rm characteristics matter for changes
to the expenditure mix, by using information on the export status of the
rm and their size. We nd no evidence that these rm characteristics help
to describe di¤erences in the e¤ects of scal policy across rms. The large
number of categories of scal expenditure included within the South Africa
data raise the possibility that there may be other changes to the expenditure
mix that a¤ect the productivity of rms other than those with relatively low
capital-labor ratios. We explore this in detail and nd limited evidence for
such di¤erences in our data, although the size of the e¤ects do di¤er quite
noticeably. The exception is for changes to education expenditure, funded
by a decrease in health and transport spending, where we nd no di¤erence
in the productivity e¤ects across rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and de-
scriptive statistics. Section 3 develops the modelling framework. Section 4
discusses the results, and Section 5 presents several robustness checks of the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Firm Level Data
The information on rms that we use comes from the World Banks En-
terprise Surveys. These data are rich in detail on rm characteristics, and
are designed to be representative of the population of (manufacturing) rms.
They contain however, at least in comparison to other rm-level datasets, a
relatively small number of observations and a limited panel dimension.
We use data from two rounds of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in
South Africa in 2002 and 2006, providing a total possible sample of 1,113
observations, covering both manufacturing and service sector rms. The sur-
vey contains questions that ask for information from earlier years, such that
while most control variables are only available for 2002 and 2006, information
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on rm output and most inputs are available for four years (2000, 2001, 2002
and 2006). The panel is unbalanced with an average number of years per
rm of approximately 1.95. We recognize that an implication of the limited
time dimension of the data is that we are likely to identify productive e¤ects
from public spending that are relatively instantaneous and miss those that
take longer to a¤ect rm decisions. We are careful to recognize this point in
the interpretation of our results for scal policy. Finally, we corrected the
data for obvious keypunch errors, deleted observations with negative inputs
or outputs and one observation with idiosyncratically high sales volatility.
The rms surveyed are located in four out of nine South African provinces
and include Gauteng, Western Cape, Kwazulu-Natal and Eastern Cape (in
descending order by the number of rms located in each province that are in-
cluded in the surveys). Within each province considered, the majority of the
rms are located in the biggest city (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and
Port Elizabeth).4 As most rms are located far away from other provinces,
it seems unlikely that they benet from spending from other provincial gov-
ernments thereby minimizing problems of spillovers across provinces.
From the survey we use total rm sales as a proxy of rm output, the
net book value of equipment and machines as a proxy of private capital, the
number of employees and the cost of materials and intermediate goods. To
account for the e¤ects of ination we deate output using a sector-specic
producer price index and the inputs using an economy-wide producer price
index. We also collect from the Enterprise Surveys information on rm own-
ership, from which we create a dummy for foreign owned rms, whether they
export or not and whether they have experienced losses due to crime.5 Ta-
bles 1 and 2 contain details about the rm-level variables and descriptive
statistics.
2.2 Public Spending Data
Using information on the location of each rm it is possible to merge the
World Bank Enterprise Survey data with provincial spending data provided
by the South African Treasury and province-level control variables which were
constructed from various o¢ cial sources. This dataset includes public spend-
ing disaggregated at the sub-sectoral level and is available for all provinces
for the scal years 2000/2001 through to 2005/2006 and province-level in-
dicators of the quality of education, road infrastructure, levels of crime and
4In the Appendix, we describe the distribution of rms across industries and provinces
in greater detail.
5A reliable variable for the age of the rm is not available and cannot be included.
Since it would be time-invariant, rm xed e¤ects capture the e¤ects of rm age.
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Table 1: Firm variables and provincial variables
Variable Description Years
sales (y) total sales per rm (in logs) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006
capital (k) net book value of machinery, vehicles, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006
and equipment (in logs)
labor (l) total workers (in logs) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006
materials (m) total cost of raw materials and intermediate 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006
goods (in logs)
exporter dummy (1 if rm sells goods in other countries) 2002, 2006
crime dummy (1 if rm su¤ers losses due to theft, 2002, 2006
robbery, vandalism or arson)
foreign dummy (1 if foreign ownership > 10%) 2002, 2006
large dummy (1 if labor > 50) 2002, 2006
murder murder rate in province (in logs) 2001 - 2006
road density length of road / surface in province (in logs) 2000 - 2006
grade percentage of learners who passed 2000 - 2006
grade 12 in province (in logs)
city_GDP GDP of the main city of province (in logs) 2000 - 2006
Table 2: Firm variables - descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
sales 11.825 2.273 4.038 19.531
capital 10.058 2.087 2.641 16.832
labor 4.025 1.626 0 9.928
materials 11.054 2.471 1.948 19.442
exporter 0.092 0.289 0 1
crime 0.463 0.499 0 1
foreign 0.507 0.5 0 1
large 0.671 0.47 0 1
The variable denitions can be found in Table 1.
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the GDP of the main city (see Table 1).6 The public spending data contain
information on both a broad set of functional expenditure categories, such as
education and health, as well as di¤erent sub-categories of these functional
expenditures. For example, as shown in Table 10 in the Appendix, within
the education expenditure category, spending on ordinary school education
and further education and training as well as adult basic training, early child
development and subsidies for independent schools are separately catalogued.
Again these are available for each province and scal year.
As described in the introduction, the objective of this paper is to explore
whether changes to the mix of public spending can a¤ect the productivity
of at least some rms. Those e¤ects will depend both on the particular
category of spending that is changed and which other expenditure categories
are assumed to decrease to compensate for this increase in order to leave total
spending unchanged. The estimated coe¢ cient will therefore reect both the
e¤ects of the expenditure category that is increased and the e¤ects of the
expenditure categories that are decreased to compensate for the increase.
It cannot be assumed for example, that the compensating categories have
no e¤ect on productivity. A coe¢ cient of zero is consistent with both an
interpretation that neither expenditure categories a¤ect productivity and
that the e¤ects of both are of an equal size and therefore o¤setting each
other. That the expenditure data for South Africa are available at such a
highly disaggregated level further stresses the need to consider this point
carefully.
Our approach to this issue is to aggregate various expenditure categories
to create a ratio variable in a way that we hope maximizes the possibility
of nding an e¤ect on productivity for some rms. We do so by including
in the denominator total expenditure including those expenditure categories
that when reduced, are less likely to a¤ect productivity. In the numerator
we generally include education, health and transport spending, but choose
to remove various sub-categories within these areas (see Table 10 for more
details), under a view that these are unlikely to impact the productivity of
rms. When total expenditure is held constant, an increase in this ratio
implies an increase in the expenditure categories included in the numerator
o¤set by those expenditure categories only included in the denominator.
As these choices are, whilst informed by previous empirical evidence, sub-
jective, we do not follow the previous literature in calling this the productive
to unproductive expenditure ratio. Instead, we prefer a label that better
6Evidence suggests that the scal data for South Africa are of a high quality. Ajan and
Aron (2007) and Quist et al. (2008) nd that the level of transparency in South Africas
budget processes is high, while South Africa ranks among the top ve developing countries
in the Open Budget Survey on budget transparency and accountability.
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reects the three main functional expenditure categories in the numerator,
education, health and transport. We label this the EHT expenditure mix as
shorthand and express it as a ratio to total public spending within a province
in each time period. We describe non-EHT spending as other expenditure
in the text. This expenditure is assumed to o¤set an increase in EHT expen-
diture in the empirical specications.
We also note that these three spending categories capture ows into the
stock of human capital and transport infrastructure within a province. The
e¤ects of the stock of human capital and transport infrastructure are them-
selves captured by the province-time e¤ects that are included in the regres-
sion. From our focus on ow expenditures we anticipate that we likely cap-
ture productivity e¤ects that occur relatively quickly, within 1-2 years, and
our results must be interpreted with that understanding in mind. We dis-
cuss the categorization of public spending in greater detail in the Appendix
and consider the robustness of our ndings to which specic items of govern-
ment expenditure we consider in the numerator of our expenditure variable
in Section 5.
Given that public spending may vary with business cycle uctuations and
any e¤ects on productivity become apparent only after some lag, we follow
the macroeconomic literature and average public spending over time (in our
case across 2 years). Specically, we combine the rm-level information for
2002 with the average of the scal data for the 2000/2001 and 2001/2002
scal years, and combine the average of scal data for the 2004/2005 and
2005/2006 scal years with the rm data from 2006. The implication of this
is that while our rm data are additionally available for 2000 and 2001, the
public spending data are not. We trade this loss of information for reducing
possible co-movement of the business cycle with rm-level productivity and
the composition of government expenditure and against considering longer
lags in the e¤ects of public spending. Depending on the specication, we
still use the 2000 and 2001 rm data for our estimation of rm production
functions.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, and Figure 1 displays EHT spend-
ing and its subcomponents as shares of total provincial expenditure by province
and year. Even with a relatively narrow denition of types of education,
health and infrastructure spending, they account for 55 per cent of total
province spending by the government. As the table makes clear, the vari-
ation in public spending categories comes primarily from variation between
provinces rather than within provinces across time. The standard devia-
tion between provinces is around 3 times that within provinces. Cross-time
changes in the expenditure mix is evident though. The share of EHT spend-
ing increased in all provinces between 2002 and 2006 (where the 2002 and
7
Table 3: EHT public spending (not in logs)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
(as a share of total exp.) (overall) (between) (within)
EHT expenditure 0.552 0.070 0.068 .022
of which education expenditure 0.339 0.032 0.032 .008
of which health expenditure 0.174 0.024 0.023 .006
of which transport and capital expenditure 0.047 0.010 0.009 .004
2006 values are in fact both averages over two scal years as explained above)
and the increases in Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were particularly
large. The table also shows that a large part of EHT spending is on ed-
ucation, which are around twice as large as those for health and over 7 times
those on transport and capital expenditure. Figure 1 implies that the shares
of EHT spending increased in all four provinces over the period considered,
but the relative increase varied and ranges from around 17 per cent in West-
ern Cape to around 25 per cent in Eastern Cape.
Figure 1: EHT expenditure by province
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3 Modelling Framework
3.1 Private Production
As is typical in the literature we assume that output, Yit, of rm i in year t,
is produced using private capital (Kit), labor (Lit), and materials (Mit). Into
this framework we incorporate a composite public input that represents the
level of public services and public capital and that enhances rm productivity,
Gpt, which varies across time and provinces, where p denotes the province.
As production technology, we use a fairly general type of CES production
function originally proposed by David and van de Klundert (1965) which
allows for the e¤ects of Gpt to be not Hicks-neutral:
Yit = A
h
1KiG
(	K+	i)
pt Kit

+

2LiG
(	L+	i)
pt Lit

+ (3Mit)

i 1

(1)
Gpt can be written as
Gpt = TptptCpt (2)
where Tpt denotes total public spending in a given province in year t, pt
denotes the share of total public spending on Gpt (i.e., that is devoted to pro-
ductive categories, i.e., EHT categories as dened in the previous sections),
and Cpt represents other province-specic factors that relate to the e¢ ciency
of public spending. Ki, Li and 	i are rm-specic technology parameters
contrary to 1;2;3, A, 	K;L and  which are also technology parameters but
common to all rms. Including Gpt in the production function captures the
idea that private vehicles can be used more productively when the quality of
the road network improves due for example, to lower maintenance require-
ments, or labor productivity is a¤ected by health-related expenditures.7
3.2 Hypotheses
The inclusion of Gpt in the production function implies that public spending
a¤ects rm-level productivity, which Barro (1990) refers to as the productive
e¤ects of public spending. Here, we are interested in the e¤ects of changes
in the composition of public spending which from (1) and (2) can be written
as
@Yit
@pt
= Y  1it
"
(	K +	i)
 
1Ki(TptCpt)
(	K+	i)Kit


(	K+	i) 1
pt
+(	L +	i)
 
2Li(TptCpt)
(	K+	i)Lit


(	L+	i) 1
pt
#
(3)
7We recognize that there may be less direct mechanisms through which public spending
a¤ects rm productivity. For instance, total factor productivity may depend on capacity
utilization, inventory levels and supplier relationships. Shirley and Winston (2004) develop
a theoretical argument along these lines.
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From (3), we derive two key hypotheses with respect to the nature of the
productive e¤ects of public spending. First, increasing the share of public
resources allocated to Gpt, pt, a¤ects private sector output via its e¤ect on
productivity (hypothesis 1).
Second, these e¤ects are heterogenous across rms as @Yit
@pt
is a function
of Ki, Li and 	i among other factors (hypothesis 2). A priori, there is no
reason to believe that these parameters are identical across all rms, and
indeed, there is a host of reasons of why this assumption is likely to hold
true. For example, the location of each rm determines access to public
services and thereby the impact of Gpt on rm productivity, or some rms
may benet from some types of expenditure more than others.
This simple framework does not make any predictions with respect to
which type of rms under this categorization benet more or less from EHT
spending. However, it seems at least likely that Ki and Li, which are rm-
specic determinants of the capital intensity, and 	i are correlated in specic
ways for a given type of G. If Ki=Li dictates that a particular rm is
relatively capital intensive and ifG primarily a¤ects the productivity of labor,
then we anticipate that 	i is relatively small. In such a case we would
anticipate that rms that are relatively labor-intensive in their production
technology are more likely to benet from spending on health, education and
public transport. Following this we initially use the capital-labor ratio of the
rm to identify di¤erences in the e¤ects of policy. We detail how we measure
the capital-labor ratio more fully in the next section of the paper.
3.3 Econometric Specications
In the empirical work we approximate (1) using the following Translog func-
tion to test hypothesis 1:
yit = + 1kit + 2lit + 3mit + 4k
2
it + 5l
2
it + 6m
2
it + 7kitlit (4)
+8kitmit + 9litmit + 10Tpt + 11pt + 12Djt + 13Cit + 14Cpt
All variables are in logs (which is denoted by variables in lower case), j de-
notes industry and pt is the share of EHT spending in total expenditure.
When testing for the e¤ects of EHT spending, we hold total spending con-
stant in the analysis by including Tpt. In this regard we follow a tradition
established in the macro literature by Devarajan et al. (1996) in estimat-
ing the growth e¤ects of changes in the public spending mix. We anticipate
that the sign on the estimated coe¢ cient for this variable can be positive or
negative, depending on whether the negative e¤ects of taxation outweigh the
positive e¤ects of total public spending (Barro, 1990).
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An important concern when testing the hypothesis whether the composi-
tion of public expenditures a¤ects rm productivity (hypothesis 1), is that we
are capturing the e¤ect of some other omitted variable that is correlated with
the expenditure mix and the error term from the regression. This form of en-
dogeneity bias might be caused by time-varying changes to the preferences of
regional governments towards private enterprise. For example, regions could
adopt a strategy of openness towards international trade and FDI in order to
encourage growth and investment and compensate the (perceived) negative
e¤ects of this by voters to the security of their employment by increased wel-
fare payments (Rodrik, 1998). Alternatively, expenditures might be targeted
at particular provinces because there is some province specic factor, such
as its geography, that raises (or lowers) the productivity of all rms located
there.
To control for observable rm and province variables that may a¤ect the
relationship between public spending and productivity, we include a series
control variables denoted by Cit and Cpt, respectively. We include di¤erences
in the access to foreign technology between rms, which are measured by
whether they are domestic or foreign owned, their export status variables
and size. To control for the social environment in which rms operate, we
add to the regression an indicator of whether the rm has been a victim of
crime. We capture province-level characteristics that matter for productivity
by including an indicator of the province-level crime rate (the murder rate),
the level of public road infrastructure as the length of the road network in
relation to the surface of each province (road density), the percentage of
learners who passed grade 12 (grade), and to control for possible agglomera-
tion and congestion e¤ects, the GDP of the main city of the province where
the rm is located (city_GDP). We also control for more di¢ cult to observe
factors using various dummy variables. In all of the regressions we include
industry-year e¤ects (Djt) to capture di¤erences in productivity shocks across
industries.
In later regressions in Section 4 we test the robustness of these ndings
to the inclusion of province-year e¤ects (Dpt) and province-industry e¤ects
(Djp). We use these to control for policy changes other than those to the
expenditure mix that occur within a province during the sample period and
time-invariant factors, such as geography or the general policy environment
which changes only slowly over time, but which may a¤ect the productivity
of all rms within an industry and province. A consequence of the inclusion
of the province-year e¤ects within the equation is that we can no longer
identify the direct e¤ect of changes in the expenditure mix, captured by
11 in equation (4), and the level of government spending, captured by 10.
By contrast, the relative e¤ect, i.e., di¤erences in the e¤ect of spending on
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di¤erent rms can still be identied. We therefore turn to hypothesis 2.
It has been discussed above that the relationship between changes to the
expenditure mix and the productivity of di¤erent South African rms is likely
to be dependent on the choice over which expenditure changes are examined.
It is also likely to be dependent upon the way in which we identify those
di¤erent rms. Our initial approach to this issue and to test hypothesis 2
is to use di¤erences in the intensity with which rms use two main inputs,
capital and labor, within the production function, the capital-labor ratio.
That is not to deny the possibility that other characteristics may also be
important, perhaps most obviously di¤erences in rm size. Again, we test
for the robustness of the results to this assumption.
To remove the e¤ects of province or industry level factors that might
a¤ect the chosen mix between capital and labor we express this as a ratio to
the annual province-industry mean. Specically, we group rms according
to their capital intensity relative to the annual province-industry mean, i.e.,
whether their relative capital intensity is low, lower medium, higher medium
or high based on the quartiles of the distribution of capital intensities across
all rms in all provinces and years. We use quartiles to capture the possibility
of non-linearities in the e¤ects of public spending. Equation (4) then becomes
yit = + 1kit + 2lit + 3mit + 4k
2
it + 5l
2
it + 6m
2
it + 7kitlit (5)
+8kitmit + 9litmit + 10Gpt + 11pt + 12 [low]pt + 13[lmed]pt
+14[hmed]pt + 15[high]pt + 16Djt + 17Cit
and low, lmed, hmed and high represent dummy variables for the rms
with relative capital intensities, Kit
Lit
=
Kpjt
Lpjt
; below the 25th, between the 25th
and the 50th, between the 50th and 75th percentiles and above the 75th
percentile, respectively. We then interact these dummies with the share of
EHT spending in total expenditure pt. Given that capital and labor (in logs)
are already included in various ways in the translog production function we do
not include the capital intensity as an additional indicator in the regressions.
While the relative e¤ects of public spending can still be identied in equation
(5), their interpretation is made problematic by the omission of the direct
e¤ect. We return to this issue and whether we can infer the direct e¤ect of
changes to public spending from our results below.
4 Results
In regression (1) in Table 5 we display the results from the estimation of
equation (4) to test hypothesis 1. In this regression we hold total expenditure
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constant and capture the e¤ects of increasing EHT expenditure as a share of
total expenditure on rm sales.
Starting with the control variables we nd that the production function
performs sensibly and the estimated elasticities (calculated at the means
of the other right-hand side variables) are within the expected range. The
elasticity with respect to physical capital and labor in regression (1) are 0.075
and 0.229 respectively and there are mildly increasing returns across all of
the private inputs for the rms in our sample. Of the rm and province-level
variables only the crime variable and the city_GDP variables are statistically
signicant at conventional levels, with the latter having a surprising negative
e¤ect on rm productivity. This may indicate that there are congestion
e¤ects in large cities which lower productivity.
Turning next to the scal variables, the estimated coe¢ cient for total
expenditure is negative and statistically signicant. Using the Barro (1990)
model to interpret this result would imply that the level of government ex-
penditure is beyond the optimal point in South Africa, such that the negative
e¤ects of taxation on growth outweigh any positive e¤ects that expenditures
might have. For the main variable of interest, the share of EHT spending, we
nd that this has a positive relationship with rm sales (with signicance at
the 10% level), suggesting that changes to the expenditure mix is associated
with rising productivity on average.
Regression 2 in Table 5 refers to our baseline estimation of hypothesis (2)
and captures alongside the e¤ect of changes to total government spending
the possibility that they di¤er across rms with di¤erent capital-labor ratios.
Note that the capital-labor ratio of the rm is measured relative to the mean
in each individual industry, province and time period. In all regressions we
continue to control for shocks to industries using a full set of industry-time
dummies and use province-industry clustered standard errors to control for
intra-class correlation.8
For the e¤ects of EHT expenditure, we nd evidence of an interesting
di¤erence in its e¤ect across rms. The coe¢ cients for this variable can be
interpreted as the e¤ect on rm-level productivity of an increase in the EHT
share compensated by a pro-rata decrease in other types of public spending,
leaving total province expenditures constant. The results indicate that such
a change to scal policy would increase productivity for rms with all but
the highest capital-labor ratios with signicance at the 10% level, for whom
we nd no e¤ect at least over the short-run. As already noted this could
8The number of provinces is too small to cluster at the provincial level only. To further
control for intra-class correlation, we use the wild cluster bootstrap indicator as proposed
by Cameron et al. (2008) which we discuss further below.
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imply either that there is no e¤ect from changes to the expenditure mix for
these rms, or that the compensating items have an e¤ect that o¤sets the
e¤ect of increased EHT spending for these rms.
In regression (3) we account for the e¤ect of time-varying province as well
as time-invariant province-industry characteristics that have been omitted
from regression (2). The former might include province-specic components
of the business cycle and policy variables not directly related to scal policy,
while the latter allow for province characteristics such as geography, that
might a¤ect the productivity of rms within an industry compared to those
in the same industry and a di¤erent province.
The province-time dummies are of course perfectly collinear with the
government expenditure variables, such that the total expenditure variable
must be omitted. This also necessitates a change in the way that we include
these dummies, and we omit the high capital-labor ratio group, such that we
now test for di¤erences in the e¤ects of scal policy relative to the reference
category.
The results from regression (3) now indicate that half of South-African
rms are a¤ected by changes to the expenditure mix (with signicance at
the 5% and 10% level, respectively). As in regression (2) we nd that the
productivity of those rms with the low and lower medium capital labor
ratios are a¤ected by changes to the expenditure mix. A strict interpretation
of the results from this regression would be that rms which use relatively less
(low and lower medium) capital to labor in production are a¤ected di¤erently
compared to rms with other capital-labor ratios from increasing the share
of spending on EHT within total scal expenditures over the short-run. If,
as implied by the results from regression (2), the productivity of those rms
with the highest capital-labor ratios is una¤ected by these changes to the
expenditure mix, then this interpretation might be further strengthened to
say that the productivity of low capital-labor ratio rms is increased. We
continue to make this assumption throughout the rest of the paper.
To evaluate the magnitude of these e¤ects further, from Table 3 we cal-
culate that the average increase in the share of EHT expenditures within
South African provinces over time (relative to the mean) was equal to 4 per
cent (the mean is 0.552 and the within province standard deviation 0.022).
Multiplying this number with the coe¢ cient estimate suggests that for rms
with a low capital-labor ratio productivity would change by 0.88 per cent
compared to high capital-labor ratio rms. The coe¢ cient estimate of the
share of EHT spending is relatively large (for instance compared to the coef-
cient on private capital). However, in practice, the productivity outcomes
are not that large when the actual variation in the scal data is considered.
As discussed above, a natural extension of the above analysis is to ex-
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plore whether there are alternative changes to the expenditure mix that
would stimulate the productivity of high capital-labor rms. We consider
this question in more detail in Table 7, using the remaining regressions in
Section 5 to explore the robustness of the initial ndings.
As already highlighted an important concern is whether our results cap-
ture the e¤ect of unobservable province-industry time-varying factors that
a¤ect both the productivity of rms within a province and the mix of s-
cal expenditures. In the absence of suitable variables to instrument for the
expenditure mix within a province, we continue with the practice started in
regression (3) of adding further control variables. This allows us to at least
judge how important omitted variables are likely to be for the results that we
nd. In regression (3) we included a full set of province-year and province-
industry dummies. In regression (4) we develop this further and control for
the possibility that there are shocks that occur at the province-industry-time
level that a¤ect productivity and the expenditure variables. The e¤ect of
the changes to the expenditure mix are therefore identied in this regression
from di¤erences in the e¤ect of policy across rms within the same province,
industry and year.
Despite the demanding nature of this identication strategy we nd that
our results are left unchanged. We continue to nd evidence that those rms
that have a low or a medium-low ratio of capital to labor relative to other
rms in their industry in that province are a¤ected by shifting the expen-
diture mix compared to high K/L rms. We also nd that the magnitude
of these e¤ects are very similar to those from regression (3), suggesting that
omitted province-industry-time e¤ects were not an important explanation for
the results in the earlier regressions.
5 Robustness of the Results
5.1 Endogeneity of Private Inputs and the Clustering
of the Standard Errors
Given the lack of a counterpart in the empirical literature, we feel that it is
important to establish the robustness of our ndings to a number of di¤erent
methodologies. Our rst robustness check addresses potential concerns about
the endogeneity of the coe¢ cients on private inputs including private capital.
It may be argued that the parameter values on the private inputs in the
production function are poorly identied as our regressions do not exploit all
of the rm-level data available to us - so far they use data for 2002 and 2006
only.
15
In order to exploit the full four years of rm data, we proceed by esti-
mating (5) in two steps. In the rst step we estimate equation (5) including
all four years of available data. In this step, we include rm xed e¤ects and
province-year e¤ects for 2002 and 2006, to avoid any bias caused by omitting
the remaining variables (including the scal variables) from this regression.9
In the second step we impose the coe¢ cients on the private input variables
estimated in step 1 and then re-estimate the model including the rm and
scal variables that were omitted from the rst stage. We hope from this
exercise to improve the precision with which we estimate the coe¢ cients on
the input variables.
In regression (5) of Table 5, we report the results from the two-stage es-
timation where the rst stage is estimated using rm xed e¤ects. Again
the results are robust to this point.10 In the two-stage estimation results
we continue to nd that the coe¢ cients on the scal variables are statisti-
cally signicant and that the estimated elasticities are largely unchanged.
Changing the mix of province-level expenditures towards EHT spending cat-
egories whilst holding the total budget constant, is associated with changes
in rm-level output for rms with a low capital intensity.11
Another concern relates to the clustering of the standard errors. In re-
gression (1) Table 6 we therefore use the wild cluster bootstrap estimator
proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) to further control for intra-class correla-
tion at the province and industry level. In this specication, we are only able
to include province-year e¤ects. The coe¢ cient on the share of EHT expen-
diture for rms with a low capital intensity remains signicant and robust,
although their magnitude decreases.
5.2 Categorization of Firms and Unobserved Firm-Level
Characteristics
Thus far we have used di¤erences in the relative factor intensity of capital
and labor of rms to identify the e¤ects of changes to the public expenditure
mix on productivity performance. The decision to express these capital-labor
ratios relative to the mean value in each industry, province and year, along
with the province-time and province-industry dummies that we include, en-
sures that our results cannot be explained by di¤erences in the characteristics
9Given that the location of rms in 2000 and 2001 is unknown, we cannot include
province-year e¤ects in these regressions. As a robustness check, we also ran regressions
with no province-year e¤ects and with province-year e¤ects for all years.
10The standard errors of the output elasticities with respect to the private inputs come
from the rst stage.
11Our results are also robust to the use of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) estimator.
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of particular industries, or because province-specic di¤erences in relative in-
put prices lead to di¤erent factor intensities across provinces. Along similar
lines, our results cannot reect the decision by an entrepreneur to open a rm
producing a particular type of product in a particular province because the
expenditure mix in that province favors a production technology of that type.
Such e¤ects will instead be reected in the mean value of the capital-labor
ratio.
The possibility that other rm characteristics might explain our results,
or may also be important, remains however. For example, if larger rms tend
to be on average more capital intensive than smaller rms, then it might be
the relative size of rm, rather than capital-labor intensity, that is impor-
tant. Alternatively, it is now well established in the international economics
literature that exporters are larger and more productive than rms that serve
the domestic market only and they may therefore respond to changes in the
expenditure mix di¤erently.
In specication (2) in Table 6 we report the results when including in-
teractions between the export status of the rms and the share of EHT
expenditure alongside the versions based on the capital-labor ratio. The re-
sults show that the export status has no signicant e¤ect for the relationship
with the change in the spending mix that we examine.12
In regressions (3) and (4) in Table 6 we explore whether the size of the rm
a¤ects the relationship with changes to the mix of public spending, which
we measure by the amount of labor, relative to the province-industry mean,
and the size of the capital stock, measured relative to the province-industry
mean (we retain the labelling of low, lmed and hmed).
We do not nd that the share of EHT expenditures matters for any of
these types of rms. Firms that are small, or medium sized, when measured
by either the amount of labor or capital they possess, are not signicantly
a¤ected by an increase in EHT spending compensated by a decrease in other
types of spending. We conclude from this exercise that the capital-labor ratio
successfully captures which rms are a¤ected by changes to scal policy that
we examine.
As an additional exercise, we test whether our results are driven by the
particular way in which we group rms based on their relative capital-labor
intensity. In specication (5), instead of using quartiles, we use quintiles of
the distribution of capital-labor across rms. In specication (5) we continue
to nd that the e¤ects of the share of EHT spending are signicant for the
bottom groups.13
12We do not rule out the possibility that this type of interaction helps to identify an
e¤ect for a change in spending we have not considered.
13Our results also remain robust to using terciles of the distribution of the relative
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Table 4: Attrition rates
Capital % of rms in 2002
intensity that are still in sample 2006
low 24.6%
lower medium 34.8%
upper medium 28.9%
high 30.2%
Another concern is that we insu¢ ciently control for unobserved rm-level
characteristics. While we control for rm xed e¤ects in the rst step of the
two-stage specications, in specication (1) of Table 7, we also add rm xed
e¤ects. Even though we only have two years of data which is the reason why
we normally do not use rm xed e¤ects at this stage in the remaining
specications, our results remain robust.
Finally, there may be a concern about the classication of rms as our
panel is unbalanced. If capital intensity is correlated with productivity, then
rm exit rates can assumed to be highest in the low capital-intensity group
and lowest in the high capital-intensity group. This would imply that the
panel is not unbalanced for idiosyncratic reasons which may bias the results.
In our sample, we dene attrition as rms that are included in the sample in
the 2002 wave but not in the 2006 wave.14 Attrition rates do indeed di¤er
between the groups, and they are highest in the low capital-labor group.
However, there does not appear to be a systematic pattern, as they are by far
lowest in the medium capital intensity group. The di¤erence in attrition rates
between the low-capital intensity group and the omitted capital intensity
group (which may have the highest productivity according to this reasoning)
is about six percentage points and therefore relatively small. Table 4 provides
details.15
capital intensities (not shown).
14By construction of the rm-level data, there is no attrition prior to 2002 as the panel
dimension for 2000 and 2001 is constructed from the 2002 questionnaire only. In addition,
we do not observe attrition after 2006.
15When we only include rms with observations in 2002 and 2006 in specication (1)
of Table 7, the coe¢ cients remain robust which is not surprising. However, this further
suggests that di¤erences in attrition rates do not a¤ect our results.
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5.3 Denition of Public Expenditure and Exogeneity
of its Composition
The richness of the public spending data for South Africa throws up an
interesting question, namely of whether there are alternative changes to the
mix of public spending that a¤ect the productivity of rms, and whether or
not those rms with low and medium-low capital intensity are a¤ected by
these changes. As explained above, given our denition of the expenditure
mix this will depend on the choice of scal expenditures that are assumed
to increase as well as which ones are assumed to decrease to compensate
for this. We use this section of the paper to explore issues relating to our
categorization of public spending.
We begin with some discussion of the denominator of the EHT variable,
which includes the remaining province-level public spending. Even though
we take averages of public spending over two years, it is conceivable that the
denominator of the spending share variable co-moves with the business cycle
because it includes transfers or other expenditures that exhibit pro-cyclical
behavior. While correlations between regional growth rates and the public
spending shares we construct indicates that this is unlikely (the correlation
coe¢ cient between the annual share of EHT spending and provincial growth
is below 0.25 and statistically not di¤erent from zero), specication (2) of
Table 7 considers this more formally.
In regression (2) of Table 7 we express EHT expenditure as a share of
total expenditure on education, health and transport sectors (i.e., the de-
nominator also includes for instance administrative spending within these
categories, but no spending outside these categories). The results from this
regression suggest that reallocating resources within total education, health
and transport spending also a¤ects the productivity of rms according to
their capital-labor ratio. Again we nd no productivity response for rms
with a capital-labor ratio above this.
In specication (3), we develop this idea further and exclude both spend-
ing on emergency care and on public works from the denominator. A pos-
sibility exists that these expenditure categories have a di¤erent sensitivity
to cyclical uctuations compared to the remaining expenditure items. For
political reasons, emergency care spending may be safeguarded from cuts
and remain fairly stable over the cycle, while in contrast, public works are
subject to long planning and execution cycles. Specication (3) now suggests
that only the productivity of those rms with the lowest capital-labor ratios
would be a¤ected by increasing this spending ratio.
Also of interest are whether our results are driven by the particular way in
which we dene EHT expenditures. Thus far we have included sub-categories
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of education, health and public infrastructure and transportation that may be
expected to be productive over the short run. When we include all subcate-
gories of health, education as well as public infrastructure and transportation,
where this now includes expenditures on administration, in specication (4)
of Table 7, the coe¢ cient of the share of EHT expenditure is again statisti-
cally signicant for rms with low and medium-low capital-labor ratios.
In specication (5), we take the alternative approach and are more selec-
tive in the subcategories of education, health as well as public infrastructure
and transportation spending we include. In this regression we include in
the numerator expenditure on early childhood development, district health
services and spending on public transportation only. The coe¢ cients for
medium-low and low K/L are much reduced in size, but remain positive and
signicant in these regressions. It is also noticeable that the estimated coe¢ -
cients are much smaller than those found up until this point, suggesting that
while signicant the relative productivity changes they cause across rms are
comparatively small compared to other changes to the expenditure mix.
As a nal exercise we include education, health and transport as separate
categories and express them as a ratio to total EHT expenditure. These are
reported in regressions (1), (2) and (3) in Table 8. Interestingly we now nd a
signicant productivity e¤ect only for health and transport spending for low
and medium-low capital labor ratio rms. As already noted, this does not
necessarily imply there are no productivity e¤ects from changes to education
expenditure as they may be o¤set by the other compensating changes that
occur in order to leave total expenditure constant. It does at least indicate
that low K/L rms are not always a¤ected by changes to the expenditure
mix in a way that is di¤erent from rms with higher K/L ratios.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines whether changes in the composition of public spending
a¤ects rm productivity and whether these e¤ects depend on rm character-
istics. We show that an increase in education, health and transport spending
compensated by a pro-rata decrease in other types of expenditure so as to
leave total expenditure constant matters for rm productivity, and that there
is evidence that its e¤ects vary across rms depending on their capital in-
tensities. We also show that those e¤ects vary with the exact change to the
expenditure mix that occurs, that di¤erences are not found across all rms
for all changes to the expenditure mix and that there are di¤erences in the
size of any e¤ects. We nd however, that rm characteristics other than the
capital-labor ratio play no important role. We also nd indicative evidence
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that low K/L rms benet from changes to the expenditure mix as their
productivity rises in contrast to more capital intensive rms.
We conclude from the evidence we present that governments are able to
a¤ect rm productivity by reallocating public spending. Given that pro-
ductivity at the rm level is likely to be fundamental for long-run aggregate
economic growth, changes to the expenditure mix may be less expensive than
raising total public spending and therefore raising additional revenues. This
is of current relevance given the large budget decits due to the recent eco-
nomic crisis in many countries. Second, if governments attempt to raise rm
productivity via the reallocation of public resources, our results indicate that
it is important that they take into account the characteristics of rms. While
this issue needs to be further explored in future research, our results indicate
that these e¤ects depend on the technology of rms that in turn drive their
capital intensities.
We leave several possible extensions for future work. The robustness of
the results could be further tested through the use of additional estimators
and empirical methods. Our identication strategy addresses endogeneity
in a manner that is similar to many other papers using macro and micro
level data, but concerns over the direction of causation therefore still remain.
There are also other aspects of the dataset that could be exploited further.
For instance, it would be possible to compare the e¤ects of aggregate EHT
spending when o¤set by di¤erent elements of the government budget, and it
would be possible to explore the role of additional rm characteristics for the
e¤ects of public spending.
One constraint of our data is certainly the availability of rm information
across fairly short time periods so that we are only able to capture any e¤ects
on productivity that occur over the short run. This implies that we are unable
to rule out that these short-run productivity gains come at the expense of
long-run productivity gains.
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Table 5: Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES sales sales sales sales sales
capital 0.0754*** 0.0563*** 0.0481*** 0.0420** 0.0311
(0.0117) (0.0167) (0.0191) (0.0338) (0.0421)
labour 0.229*** 0.245*** 0.258*** 0.264*** 0.228***
(0.0245) (0.0282) (0.0300) (0.0202) (0.0626)
materials 0.721*** 0.721*** 0.719*** 0.719*** 0.745***
(0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0180) (0.0202) (0.0241)
foreign 0.0392 0.0393 0.0305 0.0264 0.0347
(0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0278) (0.0279)
large 0.0179 0.0235 0.0310 0.0356 0.0842***
(0.0356) (0.0367) (0.0377) (0.0396) (0.0306)
exporter 0.0259 0.0266 0.0198 0.0197 0.0253
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0242) (0.0248) (0.0280)
crime -0.0268* -0.0244 -0.0200 -0.0151 -0.0273*
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0161) (0.0153)
grade 0.470 0.548
(0.493) (0.470)
city_GDP -0.346*** -0.340***
(0.123) (0.127)
murder -0.191 -0.240
(0.216) (0.209)
road density 0.000182 -0.00129
(0.00706) (0.00665)
total exp. -0.652*** -0.622**
(0.227) (0.236)
EHT exp. low([Kit/Lit]/[Kjpt/Ljpt]) 1.481* 0.221** 0.256** 0.260***
(0.813) (0.0939) (0.109) (0.0734)
EHT. exp. lmed.([Kit/Lit]/[Kjpt/Ljpt]) 1.425* 0.125* 0.149* 0.124***
(0.820) (0.0651) (0.0755) (0.0455)
EHT. exp. hmed.([Kit/Lit]/[Ljpt/Ljpt]) 1.392* 0.0745 0.0752 0.0446
(0.814) (0.0607) (0.0647) (0.0639)
EHT. exp. high([Kit/Lit]/[Ljpt/Ljpt]) 1.325
(0.824)
EHT exp. 1.494*
(0.788)
Constant 10.38*** 10.59*** 3.040*** 2.840*** 4.094***
(3.233) (3.254) (0.404) (0.409) (0.0427)
Observations 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113
R2 0.973 0.973 0.975 0.975
Province-Year FE NO NO YES NO YES
Industry-Year FE YES YES YES NO YES
Province-Ind. FE NO NO YES NO YES
Prov.-Ind.-Year FE NO NO NO YES NO
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ind.-prov. clustered standard errors in parentheses; (1)-(4): OLS estimation based on 2002 and 2006
(5): 2-step estimation; 1st step rm FE with private inputs based on 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006
2nd step: based on 2002 and 2006 and coe¢ cients of private inputs imposed
Table 6: Robustness I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES sales sales sales sales sales
capital 0.0585 0.0482*** 0.0755*** 0.0576*** 0.0474***
(0.0180) (0.0120) (0.0194) (0.0180)
labour 0.253 0.258*** 0.244*** 0.232*** 0.259***
(0.0190) (0.0282) (0.0251) (0.0191)
materials 0.714 0.719*** 0.720*** 0.718*** 0.719***
(0.0301) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0303)
foreign 0.0509*** 0.0308 0.0280 0.0295 0.0302
(0.0269) (0.0276) (0.0270) (0.0273)
large -0.00309 0.0311 0.0277 0.0238 0.0313
(0.0376) (0.0330) (0.0369) (0.0376)
exporter 0.0392 0.0192 0.0202 0.0197
(0.0241) (0.0248) (0.0243)
crime -0.0270*** -0.0199 -0.0207 -0.0194 -0.0201
(0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0155)
EHT exp. low 0.149*** 0.220** -0.0845 0.198 0.227**
(0.0939) (0.126) (0.138) (0.0970)
EHT exp. lmed. 0.0939*** 0.124* 0.00714 0.141 0.130*
(0.0652) (0.0791) (0.105) (0.0659)
EHT exp. hmed. 0.0722 0.0742 0.0196 0.0531 0.0789
(0.0606) (0.0576) (0.0698) (0.0544)
EHT exp. high 0.0141
(0.0758)
EHT exp. [exporter] -0.0253
(0.0325)
Constant 2.859*** 3.034*** 2.016*** 3.174*** 3.041***
(0.773) (0.404) (0.446) (0.423) (0.403)
Observations 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113
R2 0.970 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-Year FE NO YES YES YES YES
Province-Ind. FE NO YES YES YES YES
Prov.-Ind.-Year FE NO NO NO NO
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ind.-prov. clustered standard errors in parentheses
OLS estimates based on 2002 and 2006.
(1): CGM Wildboot with clustering at prov. and ind. level
(2) share of EHT. exp. interacted with export status
(3) relative labor use interacted with share of EHT exp.
(4) relative capital use interacted with share of EHT exp.
(5) relative capital intensity categories based on 20th percentiles intervals
Table 7: Robustness II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES sales sales sales sales sales
capital -0.00379 0.0510*** 0.0509*** 0.0494*** 0.0484***
(0.0306) (0.0296) (0.0304) (0.0192) (0.0185)
labour 0.448*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.258*** 0.258***
(0.0876) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0171) (0.0191)
materials 0.697*** 0.719*** 0.720*** 0.719*** 0.719***
(0.0303) (0.0190) (0.0192) (0.0301) (0.0302)
foreign -0.0355 0.0306 0.0322 0.0300 0.0309
(0.102) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0269)
large -0.0354 0.0306 0.0328 0.0301 0.0290
(0.151) (0.0379) (0.0387) (0.0375) (0.0377)
exporter -0.0515 0.0197 0.0192 0.0199 0.0201
(0.0841) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0242) (0.0242)
crime 0.0223 -0.0205 -0.0197 -0.0195 -0.0203
(0.0412) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0154)
EHT exp. low([Kit/Lit]/[Kjpt/Ljpt]) 0.450*** 0.308* 0.369* 0.587*** 0.0541**
(0.105) (0.155) (0.202) (0.219) (0.0244)
EHT exp. lmed.([Kit/Lit]/[Kjpt/Ljpt]) 0.303*** 0.175 0.223 0.326** 0.0304*
(0.0788) (0.107) (0.141) (0.159) (0.0166)
EHT exp. hmed.([Kit/Lit]/[Ljpt/Ljpt]) -0.0150 0.109 0.123 0.179 0.0211
(0.128) (0.0991) (0.126) (0.148) (0.0160)
Constant 4.440*** 3.021*** 3.010*** 3.048*** 3.062***
(0.950) (0.403) (0.383) (0.405) (0.402)
Observations 1,113 1,113 1,095 1,113 1,113
R2 0.966 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
Number of eec_panelid 981
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Province-Ind. FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES NO NO NO NO
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ind.-prov. clustered standard errors in parentheses
OLS estimates based on 2002 and 2006
(1) Firm xed e¤ects added
(2) EHT exp. as a ratio of all exp. in these categories
(3) same as (2) except that emergency and public works is excluded from denominator
(4) broad denition of EHT expenditure used
(5) narrow denition of EHT expenditure used
Table 8: Robustness III
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES sales sales sales
capital 0.0581*** 0.0519*** 0.0487***
(0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0304)
labour 0.249*** 0.255*** 0.258***
(0.0287) (0.0191) (0.0191)
materials 0.719*** 0.719*** 0.719***
(0.0192) (0.0300) (0.0182)
foreign 0.0309 0.0309 0.0310
(0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270)
large 0.0253 0.0279 0.0280
(0.0379) (0.0376) (0.0375)
exporter 0.0205 0.0202 0.0206
(0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0243)
crime -0.0205 -0.0204 -0.0204
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0154)
EHT exp. low([Kit/Lit]/[Kjpt/Ljpt]) 0.182 0.1000** 0.0530**
(0.113) (0.0482) (0.0237)
EHT exp. lmed.([Kit/Lit]/[Kjpt/Ljpt]) 0.0904 0.0542* 0.0284*
(0.0747) (0.0319) (0.0159)
EHT exp. hmed.([Kit/Lit]/[Ljpt/Ljpt]) 0.100 0.0406 0.0204
(0.0794) (0.0323) (0.0157)
Constant 3.030*** 3.062*** 3.076***
(0.399) (0.404) (0.400)
Observations 1,113 1,113 1,113
R2 0.975 0.975 0.975
Province-Year FE YES YES YES
Industry-Year FE YES YES YES
Province-Ind. FE YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ind.-prov. clustered standard errors in parentheses
OLS estimation based on 2002 and 2006
(1) EHT spending only includes education exp. categories
(2) EHT spending only includes health exp. categories
(3) EHT spending only includes transport exp. categories
A Appendix
A.1 The System of Fiscal Decentralization in South
Africa
Since the end of the Apartheid era, South Africa has undergone wide-ranging
scal reforms, and a system of transparent, constitutionally compliant inter-
governmental scal relations has been created. Government now comprises
three spheres: national, provincial and local. The scal system departs from
conventional prescripts of scal federalism however because there is a mis-
match between expenditure and revenue powers at each of these di¤erent
levels of government (Ajam and Aron, 2007).
Public expenditure policy is decentralized in a range of important areas.
Provincial governments are largely responsible for spending on provincial
roads, education (except higher education), health services, public trans-
portation, social welfare services, housing and agriculture. For these func-
tions, the level of public spending by the national government is very low, and
the national government is mainly responsible for setting minimum norms
and standards and for monitoring the overall implementation by provincial
governments. It also collects data on provincial public spending (Momoniat,
2002). The expenditure that the national government undertakes can be
expected to leave rm productivity una¤ected over the medium run, or it -
nances public goods such as national roads or higher education and research.
In these cases, signicant country-wide spillovers imply that there is no or
little variation between the provinces. By contrast, provincial governments
provide goods and services that are unlikely to entail signicant spillovers
across provinces.
At the same time, the revenue side of government in South Africa is
fairly centralized: provincial governments collect very little revenue, and the
income raised within the province typically amounts to less than 5 per cent
of the provincial budget (Ajam and Aron, 2007). In the period that we con-
sider, provinces have neither imposed nor collected broad base taxes, and the
revenue collected came from various licences (notably motor vehicle licences),
sales of goods, services and capital assets and various small base taxes (e.g.
taxes on gambling and horse racing). In addition, while in principle, provin-
cial governments are allowed to borrow to nance capital expenditure, in
practice borrowing is quite limited. Provincial governments are therefore
highly dependent on transfers from the national government. They receive
conditional grants which they have to earmark for pre-specied purposes,
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such as health, infrastructure, housing and social development, and they re-
ceive non-earmarked grants (which are referred to as equitable share grants)
(Ajam and Aron, 2007). The level of the latter that a given province receives
depends on range of social and economic indicators.
A.2 Industry-Level Descriptive Statistics
This Appendix reports the number of rms in the sample by industry, province
and year. In some industries and provinces, there are relatively few rms
(Table 8). Our results remain robust when we exclude the industries and
provinces with few observations (we do not report these results).
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Table 9: Distribution of rms by industry across provinces
industry no. of obs % of obs. % of obs. % of obs.
(2002 - 2006) in KN in GT in WC
Mining & quarrying 3 0.0% 33.3% 66.7%
Sale, Maintenance & repair of vehicles 2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Manufacture of food & bevarages 154 5.2% 68.2% 18.2%
Manufacture of tobacco products 1 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Manufacture of textiles 21 19.0% 38.1% 33.3%
Manufacture of wearing apparel 115 14.8% 57.4% 19.1%
Manufacture of luggage & footwear 20 15.0% 70.0% 5.0%
Manufacture of wood 49 16.3% 61.2% 20.4%
Manufacture of paper 26 19.2% 65.4% 11.5%
Publishing, printing & reproduction 47 14.9% 46.8% 38.3%
Manufacture of coke & rened petroleum 3 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Manufacture of chemicals 122 8.2% 69.7% 14.8%
Manufacture of rubber & plastics 47 8.5% 68.1% 19.1%
Manufacture of non-metallic products 25 12.0% 68.0% 20.0%
Manufacture of basic metals 20 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Manufacture of metal products 149 15.4% 69.8% 11.4%
Manufacture of machinery 64 4.7% 84.4% 10.9%
Manufacture of o¢ ce machinery 2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Manufacture of electrical machinery 65 6.2% 84.6% 4.6%
Manufacture of motor vehicles 24 12.5% 62.5% 4.2%
Manufacture of furniture 150 6.7% 65.3% 22.0%
Recycling 1 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Wholesale & retail trade 2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Hotels & restuarants 1 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
all, 2002 - 2006 1113 10.1% 67.7% 16.7%
Note: Eastern Cape is omitted and contains the remaining number of rms.
KN (Kwazulu-Natal), GT (Gauteng), WC (Western Cape)
A.3 Categorization of Public Expenditure
In the empirical specications, we assume that expenditure within education,
health, as well as public infrastructure and transportation (EHT) is increased
and that this increase is o¤set using expenditure outside these areas and other
expenditure on specic items within these areas. The underlying assumption
is that EHT expenditure a¤ects productivity to a larger extent than the
o¤setting expenditure over a period of 1 to 2 years.
Within spending on public infrastructure and transportation referred to
as transport expenditure, we assume that spending on public transport,
tra¢ c management and road infrastructure which includes spending on road
maintenance can be expected to deliver fairly quickly tangible benets for
rms. For instance, improved tra¢ c lights may cut travel time, lling pot-
holes lowers the cost for repairs, and new bus lines help the work force to
reach their workplace more quickly. Spending on public health may also
rapidly improves labor productivity, if for instance it results in increased
availability of drugs against common diseases, or if public awareness to pre-
vent accidents or certain types of diseases increases. We therefore consider
spending on district and provincial health services as productive. Here, we
expect that public spending may ensure that the work force remains t for
work.
Even spending on education may have almost immediate e¤ects on pro-
ductivity: for instance, as a result of education spending on early childhood
development, labor productivity of the parents may improve fairly quickly.
In addition, improved education of students shortly prior to graduation or
spending on short courses for adults may a¤ect labor productivity over the
medium run because this type of education is rather short and provides parts
of the workforce with skills which are directly relevant for their jobs. We
therefore expect that spending on further education and training as well as
adult basic education and training as well as spending on public and private
schools in general potentially a¤ects private productivity over the medium
run.
However, other subcategories are likely to hardly a¤ect productivity of
rms over the medium run, or not at all. For all three areas, we exclude
spending on administration as there are only indirect e¤ects, at best. For
the same reason, within the health sector, we exclude health care support
services and health facilities management. We also exclude spending on
health sciences and training as any potential productive e¤ects only mate-
rialize over longer time horizons, and we exclude central hospital services
which are likely to treat many patients who are not part of the work force,
at least temporarily. In addition, we exclude emergency medical services
which includes emergency and planned patient transport; here the link to
rm-level productivity is also less clear. With respect to education spending,
apart from administration, we exclude spending on auxiliary and associated
services and on public special school education where the links with private
sector productivity are also less direct.
Finally, within the public infrastructure and transportation category,
there are a number of areas which are probably less or not relevant at all
for rm productivity. This includes public works which a¤ects productivity
at best over longer horizons or not at all (e.g., spending on public works in
agriculture which we are unable to separate from spending on public works
in say education) and spending on programmes within communities which
can expected to have social rather than productive benets.
Table 10 provides an overview of how we categorize public spending.
Obviously, we recognize that one could also make alternative choices about
which subcategories are considered as productive within the health, educa-
tion and public infrastructure and transportation categories. We therefore
consider the robustness of the our results to these choices in Section 5.
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